THE AFRICAN STAND-BY FORCE (ASF)

ROADMAP III

References:

A. AU Policy Framework for the establishment of the ASF and the MSC.
F. 5th Meeting of the African Chiefs of Defense Staff and Heads of Security of March 2008
H. 6th Meeting of the African Chiefs of Defense Staff and Heads of Security of May 2009
I. 3rd Ordinary Meeting of Specialized Committee on Defense, Safety and Security of May 2009
INTRODUCTION

This document remains an interim document until all the lessons learned on Exercise AMANI AFRICA have been assessed and until the planned independent evaluation of the ASF had been completed. It will draw on what has been achieved, assess what needs to be done, and deliver the Outputs contained in the Plan of Action at Annex A. Furthermore, the five year timeframe is based on a realistic appraisal of the time it will take to achieve Full Operational Capability for the ASF as a whole.

1. This is the third in a series of Roadmaps based on the Foundation Document for the Operationalization of the African Standby Force (ASF) by 2010. Good progress has been made in several areas. However, due to unforeseen developments, the ASF would not be able to meet the criteria for its Full Operational Capability (FOC) by 2010.

2. It would be recalled that ASF Roadmap I was set out to create the base policy documents for the ASF, including Doctrine, Command, Control, Information System (C3IS), Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), Logistics and Training and Evaluation, while Roadmap II was aimed at a period of consolidation culminating in Exercise AMANI AFRICA during which progress could be evaluated and the ASF concept validated. Drawing on the lessons learnt from the two previous Roadmaps, and from the outputs to date from Exercise AMANI AFRICA, it is envisaged that ASF Roadmap III would highlight those areas where reflection on the ASF concept is needed and recommend an approach over the next five years that will further advance the utility of the ASF as a tool of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).

3. In 2003, the expectations and goals of the founding fathers was articulated in an ASF Vision. Progress towards achieving the goal set in 2003 has been hampered by an apparent lack of buy-in to the ASF concept both at Continental, regional and Member States levels. The ASF does need a clear demonstration of political will if the goals set out in the vision were to be achieved. The ASF is part of APSA, so there needs to be buy-in from the PSC, the Peace and Security structures in the Regional Economic Communities/ Regional Mechanisms (REC/RMs) Member States of the African Union (AU), and the senior leadership within the AU Commission. A demonstration of this commitment would be the involvement of all relevant divisions within the Peace and Security Department, on one hand, and other departments of the AUC, on the other hand, in all ASF related activities. Furthermore, there must be an urgent plan to address issues of recruitment of personnel, development of procedures for planning and deploying AU mandated missions, and the creation of a proper work environment.
AIM

4. The aim of this paper is to develop an ASF Roadmap III that will fully operationalize the ASF by 2015, building on the earlier work done in ASF Roadmaps I and II.

BACKGROUND

5. The conceptual basis for the ASF is contained in the Foundation Document, which was endorsed at the meeting of African Chiefs of Defence and Security in Maputo, Mozambique, in May 2003. The Concept is further described in the document ‘Conceptualising AU Peace Support Operations’.

6. It is important to recognise that a great deal has been achieved so far in the development of the ASF. These achievements include a suite of common policy documents, an annual continental training programme, and improved training standards within nations, and standby forces that can be used collectively albeit at an initial operational capability at the moment, mainly for logistic and institutional reasons. Good progress has also been made towards developing the Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) concept.

7. Considerable progress has equally been made in the development of the Police Component of the ASF, notably in the area of policy development and the establishment of management capabilities at the strategic level of the AU and the operational level of the RECs/RMs.

8. The establishment of the civilian component has continued to lag behind the military and police components for a number of reasons. First, the concept of the roles and functions, structure and composition of that component is not well understood. Second, besides its leadership role and functions, it is difficult to envisage the output from the civilian component when not actually engaged in missions. A general view has been that in relative terms, the civilian component is only required to provide overall leadership, and coordinate and facilitate the work of other actors (humanitarian, human rights, gender, children, DDR, SSR), in accordance with international norms. In addition, the civilian component is also envisaged to be able to carry out key support functions (finance, legal, contracting, procurement, HR, conduct and discipline, etc) in AU and regional organizations, including ASF headquarters in the field.

MATTERS OUTSTANDING FROM ROADMAP II

9. There are several matters that remain outstanding from Roadmap II that still have to be addressed in roadmap III. These issues, which reflect some of the difficulties of implementing roadmap II, are outlined below:
a. **Advocacy and Outreach.** Despite considerable efforts made at mainstreaming the ASF, there is still a low level of awareness and commitment within the AUC, Regions and Member States. There is little understanding of its purpose and limitations of the use of force to resolve conflicts or of the planning and management required to support PSOs. Therefore, there is the need for a continental communication strategy, as part of Roadmap III in order to educate and sell the ASF Concept.

b. **Structures and Management Capabilities.** The lack of institutional capacity and effective coordination between the AUC and RECs/RMs is one of the main blockages to standardized planning and management procedures for future ASF missions.

i. The management structures for the ASF at the strategic and operational levels remain rudimentary. Management of PSO cannot work without trained personnel

ii. Separate proposals have been submitted regarding structures but approval is taking time. If approved, personnel, many of whom should be civilian, will need to be recruited and trained so implementation will still take several months. In the meantime, the training opportunities presented by Exercise AMANI AFRICA are being missed.

c. **Political Process.** There is currently no written procedure governing AU political decision making and subsequent Mission planning. As a result of Exercise AMANI AFRICA, a draft Aide Memoire has been produced that should provide the basis for a clear methodology which will help to professionalize decision making and mission planning. It is envisaged that this document would be endorsed as a working policy document for the AUC for planning and mandating peace support operations.

d. **Operational Concepts.** The RDC Concept has been harmonized between regions, including with the military, police and civilian components, and should be submitted for endorsement before this Roadmap is finalized.

e. **Logistic Considerations.** A decision has yet to be taken on the requirement for a Continental Logistic Base. What is required is a logistic base serving the initial deployment of AU Missions. It should, among others, contain a ‘get-you-in’ pack for a brigade sized mission – a transportable mission HQ, a container based field hospital, defense stores, power generators and water purification kits.

f. **Development of Legal Framework.** Work on developing the legal framework has yet to be completed.

i. The development of the ASF legal framework in accordance with the recommendations of the 1st Workshop on ASF Legal issues conducted in July 2006 is outstanding. This should provide an opportunity to develop most of the templates of legal documents, including generic Mandates, Directives/Terms of Reference to mission leaders, Status of Mission/Forces Agreement (SOMA/SOFA),
Contributing Agreements (CAs) or MOU with Member States, Hosting Agreement, etc. Roadmap III will include this in the Plan of Action.

ii. In the same vein, a comprehensive MOU on the use of the ASF for AU mandated missions, needs to be finalized and adopted. This MOU should clarify the relationship between the AU, RECs/RMs and Member States. This is without prejudice to the existing MOU signed between the AU and the RECs/RMs on issues of peace and security. Also, the AU should continue to explore the possibility of signing MOUs with the UN and other partners, to define the critical areas that need external support and assistance and the mechanisms to be followed in accessing such support. The official MOUs should be addressed and finalized before the end of 2012. One of these initiatives is the ongoing efforts between the AU and UN on the modalities of supporting AU PSOs as indicated in the UNSG Report of 18 September 2009.

g. Financial Frameworks. The Workshop on ASF Financial aspects, including procurement, budget and donor reporting procedures, which was postponed, will be reconvened and finalized during Roadmap III.

REQUIREMENTS FOR ASF ROADMAP III

CONCEPT REVIEW

10. The ASF Concept was agreed nearly 10 years ago with 2010 set as the date by which the ASF should be operational. This was an ambitious target which, despite a great deal of effort, has not been achieved. Arguably therefore, on the basis that circumstance may have changed since the concept was originally designed and the goal remains elusive. Time has now come to reconfirm that the ASF remains the wishes of the Member States. The discussion below proposes the need for Roadmap III to review of the conceptual start point.

11. **ASF Vision.** The original Vision for the ASF was that Standby Brigades could deploy as an entity; the concept was military focussed and with a clear mindset that peacekeeping was essentially a military activity with other dimensions in support of the military effort.

   a. **Multi-dimensionality.** The peacekeeping paradigm has changed and the importance of integrated missions is no longer questioned. However, the three dimensions are very different: the military exist for deployment on missions, the police are there to police the nation on a daily basis, and the civilians are similarly engaged on a daily basis but, unlike the police, are also a disparate collection of individuals. Therefore the Vision may have been flawed and may have become distorted through a desire to integrate at an inappropriate level. Roadmap III will therefore start with an update of the ASF
Vision, to serve as a reconfirmation of the AU’s Strategic Intent and to provide a vehicle to support advocacy of the ASF concept.

b. **Review of ASF Scenarios**  As part of updating the Vision, the six original scenarios ought to be reviewed. This will allow universal changes in peacekeeping doctrine and developments in AU conflict management to be properly reflected. It will also allow changes in the threats to continental peace and stability to be recognised. The scenarios should reflect the multi-dimensional aspects of conflict management and in particular the political requirements.

c. **Review of ASF Implementation Framework.**

i. Although the AU PSOD has achieved considerable progress in establishing capabilities at the strategic level, it still lacks the capacity to manage complex peacekeeping operations as specified in ASF Roadmap II. Similarly, the RECs/RMs do not have the full capacity to deploy a mission headquarters for Scenario 4 involving AU/Regional forces. Both of these situations owe to the fact that the AU PSOD and the RECs/RMs have not been able to fully establish the civilian and, to some extent, the police components of the respective PLANELMs.

ii. In addition, however, new experiences, including the planning and preparations for Exercise AMANI AFRICA, point to the need for the ASF to be able to deploy rapidly for Scenario 6 missions. This implies that national legislative mechanisms must be in place to allow for rapid deployment of pledged units, especially when on standby for up to periods of 6 months, in response to Scenario 6 missions outside of the parent regions, and that are mandated by the Assembly.

iii. The change in emphasis would result in a greater focus on the development of regional capabilities, on the need for programmed strategic level enhancements in the area of mission planning, training coordination and logistic and general service support. It would necessitate the development of a logistic base and identified predictable and sustainable financial mechanism.

iv. Adopting this proposal would demand an emphasis, in the first place, on developing Regional Standby Capabilities, for use in regional PSO. Secondly, it would require the AU to focus on operationalizing the RDC concept for use in Scenario 6 situations, as well as during urgent humanitarian disaster situations that require an urgent ASF assistance and support.

d. **Review of Capability Requirements.**  Any change in the Scenarios will undoubtedly affect the capabilities required of the ASF. The ASF was designed as a land-based structure. Maritime threats were not envisaged but have become a reality and technological advancements allow smaller capabilities to become more effective. The ASF ‘Standby Brigade’ requirement should reflect the requirements dictated by the Scenarios.
Review of Structures  Capabilities cannot be divorced from the organisational structures needed to manage them so any review whether, in principle, the structures are correct. At the strategic level, the AUC PSOD structure has proved inadequate for planning and managing complex peacekeeping operations. Similarly, the structures at the REC/RM level (PLANELMS and Standby Brigade HQ) are confused and reflect the old paradigm of military peacekeeping.

LESSONS FROM EXERCISE AMANI AFRICA

12. Exercise AMANI AFRICA, and the regional Field Training Exercises (FTXs), have underlined the major lessons highlighted by previous AU PSOs. These lessons underscored the need for a pragmatic and workable solutions to the daunting challenges of planning, managing and sustaining deployed missions. There is need therefore to respond to these lessons and establish best practices that will help to enhance the operationalization of the ASF. These lessons are summarised below and will be tackled in Roadmap III.

a. **Strategic-level Capacity Building.** The greatest challenge for AU PSO lies at the strategic-level. It is here that AU PSO Missions are planned, launched, managed, sustained and eventually liquidated. This lack of capacity was identified as a major problem during the planning for Exercise AMANI AFRICA and it undermines the integrity of the whole ASF concept. The AU Strategic Plan provides an opportunity to rationalise the core staffing requirement for peace support activities especially in the area of mission planning and mission support, including recruitment, contracting, procurement, budget, finance and reporting. These are essential activities for peace support operations requiring for the most part, trained civilians. But because of the pace of operations they need to be part of PSD.

b. **PSC – ASF Relationship.** The ASF was established in order to enable the PSC to perform its responsibilities with respect to the deployment of PSO missions and interventions pursuant to Articles 4 (h) and (j) of the AU Constitutive Act. Therefore the relationship between the PSC and the ASF, as well as the other departments of the AUC, from the mandating process to the deployment, and the sustainment and liquidation phases, needs to be clarified and understood by all. Advocacy through regular briefings will be a feature of this aspect of Roadmap II.

c. **PSO Policy Documents Review.** The draft ASF Policy Documents (Doctrine, C³IS, Logistics, Training and SOPs) all need to be updated in the light of Lessons Learnt. This needs to be done systematically during the period.

d. **Establishing Mission Headquarters.** The AMANI AFRICA Politico-Strategic Seminar and previous RECs/RMs FTXs have shown the difficulties in establishing mission headquarters. The AU and the Regions need now to determine how best to establish core mission headquarters. The efficient and effective application of this system should be tested during Exercise AMANI.
AFRICA and should lead to an impassionate review, including the proposed concept of Regional Standby Capabilities for all 3 components.

e. **Physical Infrastructure.** While the different AU mechanisms and processes are progressing well, the physical infrastructure at the AU for the Peace and Security Department is inadequate. Facilities, such as communications and office equipment, are not suitable to support the level of work of the Peace and Security Department. This undermines the efficiency and professionalism of the institution and the job satisfaction of individual staff. There is a clear requirement, therefore, to look at how the physical environment, including the available equipment and ICT infrastructure, can best support PSOs processes and mechanisms that are being developed. In this regard, existing proposed donors support for the establishment of such infrastructure should be implemented with a sense of urgency.

f. **SOPs for Strategic Headquarters.** The ASF has only developed SOPs for field mission headquarters. Exercise AMANI AFRICA Politico-Strategic Seminar has underscored the urgent need for SOPs for the AU strategic level and REC/RM operational level headquarters.

g. **Continental CIS System.** The development of a continental ICT System will have to be funded and installed before the ASF will be able to deploy, conduct and support operations in the field. The ASF will not be at FOC until this happens.

i. **AU Mission.** The start-up of Missions is always significantly delayed while CIS systems are procured and put in place. A system that would allow every day communications and data exchange between elements of the AUC/ASF/REC/RMS while at the same time allow ASF elements to take the systems with them when they deploy to the field is what is required. The lack of CIS leads to the assumption that the ASF will never be deployed as such. If that is the case, it should be made clear to staffs and to partners so that the level of engagement with the ASF can be tailored accordingly.

ii. **RDC.** The use of a RDC in situations of genocide and gross abuse (and possible natural humanitarian disasters) is again predicated on the appropriate RDC/ASF elements having communications and information systems.

h. **Intelligence/Information Capability.** At the strategic level, the AU PSOD and RECs/RMs will make use of intelligence from the Strategic Intelligence Unit at the AUC and at the RECs/RMs and Member States in planning ASF missions. This notwithstanding, there is need for intelligence and information gathering and processing capability within the AU PSOD and within missions. During Roadmap III, the AU PSOD should undertake a special study and provide recommendations for practicable structures to establish such intelligence capability for ongoing mission planning and management at the level of the PSOD and within missions.
REGIONAL ACTIVITIES

13. To complement this Roadmap, Regions should create a Regional Action Plan that includes:
   a. Enhancing the Regional Standby Brigade capability: specifically the military capability but also, in conjunction with the AU, the Police and Civilian components within the region;
   b. Enhancing Regional political/operational linkages for decision taking;
   c. Enhancing Regional/National linkages, including legislation on the use of the Regional capability and RDC in particular;
   d. On its part, the AU should commit to providing logistic and general service support and coordination of the civilian and police components of RDC and ASF missions, in support of the regional capability.

RDC DEVELOPMENT

14. The RDC Concept envisages a rapidly deployable strong capability within each region. The capability needs to be flexible in its composition and capable of reacting to urgent situations with the right tools. The RDC by its very nature is a short term capability. It should not remain deployed for more than 3 months before being augmented and relieved. The AU Assembly is the authority for deploying the RDC. The Roadmap III Plan of actions should tackle the following issues:
   a. The AU will organize a Roster to ensure that at any one time there will be two different regions providing this standby capability, through a cycle of training and standby and, where necessary, deployment and recovery.
   b. Each of the regions has developed RDCs to a greater or lesser extent. What is now required is refinement of the concept, harmonization where there are issues that need to be harmonized, and detailed operational planning between the AU and REC/RMs on deployment and on logistic planning.
   c. It is recommended that the RDC concept should be tested, evaluated and made operational by 2012.

HUMANITARIAN ACTION AND SUPPORT IN CASE OF NATURAL DISASTERS

15. Article 15 of the PSC Protocol requires the PSC to take active part in coordinating and conducting humanitarian action in order to restore life to normalcy in the event of conflicts or natural disasters in Africa during the time span of this Roadmap.
a. The AUC has a Humanitarian Affairs, Refugees and Displaced Persons Division (HADPD) within the Department of Political Affairs, which has developed a policy/strategy for interventions, notably for coordination with UN and other humanitarian partners.

b. However, immediate lessons learned from the ASF exercises at the levels of the AU and RECs/RMs, points to the fact that the ASF lacks a comprehensive concept of operations for supporting humanitarian assistance efforts in accordance with international practice and standards.

c. PSOD should hold consultations with the HAPDP and other UN and international stakeholders, in determining a comprehensive concept of operations for the role, functions and tasks envisaged for the ASF in support of humanitarian operations.

**MARITIME SECURITY AND SAFETY**

16. The issue of maritime security and safety has assumed greater importance over the past few years. In this respect, the roadmap will build on the conclusions of the workshop on maritime security and safety held in Addis Ababa in April 2010, and will seek to identify the specific role to be played by the ASF in the protection of the African maritime domain.

**BUDGET CONSIDERATIONS**

17. The activities that need to be supported in connection with the activities associated with this Roadmap are outlined in the Plan of Action at Annex A. In asking for decisions regarding the way forward, cognizance needs to be taken as to the cost of developing and sustaining the ASF, the Logistic Depot, the PLANELMS, for recruiting and training the associated personnel and for the more general training associated with operationalizing the components of the ASF.

18. Most of the funding comes from donors, who are having to compromise on what they can support. That being so, the activities of the ASF need to be prioritized in terms of what is important for the AU and what does not have Member State buy-in. In addition, the AU could look at innovative ways of breaking the dependency on donors.

**TRAINING**

19. One of the major gaps identified within the ASF Planning Element at both the continental and regional levels is lack of requisite training in planning for peace support operations. It is envisaged that during the implementation of ASF Roadmap III, there would be a deliberate attempt to carry out a Training Needs Analysis for the
Planning Elements at AUC and regional level to identify their peculiar training needs and develop training programmes accordingly.

20. Much of the focus of ASF training has been driven by Exercise AMANI AFRICA, which culminated in a CPX before the end of 2010. The RECs/RMs have followed a regime of training starting with MAPEXs and progressing to FTXs. Roadmap III should contain a continental event for the RDC in 2012 and for other ASF missions in 2015.

21. An ASF Training Conference should continue to be held annually in order to harmonize training across the continent and for all components. This conference should include the participation of the RECs/RMs and centers of excellence, as well as the African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA), in order for the AU PSOD and RECs/RMs to clearly outline the training needs of the ASF.

LOGISTIC AND GENERAL SERVICE SUPPORT MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY

22. The AU continues to be dependent on external assistance and support from the UN and other partners. While this is expected to continue in the foreseeable future, it is necessary that the AUC develops capacity to manage such assistance and support once delivered by the UN and partners and not continue to depend on them to do this as well. Equally important is the need for the AUC to develop its own integral field support mechanism to support ongoing and future AU missions.

23. In order to reverse this management dependency during Roadmap III, it is proposed to develop adequate human capacity, infrastructure and equipment, for the effective management and reporting of external assistance and support that will ensure smooth functioning RDC and other ASF deployed missions.

24. The publication of a comprehensive logistics manual is another key shortcoming that will hamper the ASF from achieving its full operating capability. There is need therefore to expedite the production of a single manual for logistic and general service support premised on the AUC supporting missions from a Continental Logistic Depot.

RELATIONS WITH PARTNERS

25. The AUC recognizes the various levels of support that has been made by partners towards the operationalization of the ASF during Roadmaps I and II. It is important that such support is streamlined within the management of PSOD, in ensuring that every support, both to the AUC and the RECs/RMs, meets the needs of the ASF and is in accordance with the agreed objectives in the Roadmap.
United Nations (UN)

26. PSOD will continue to strengthen its partnership with the UN. Therefore, the AU and UN should explore the possibility of developing a program for more predictable UN support for the deployment and sustainment of future ASF missions, especially in the following areas:

   a. **Training.** PSOD will ensure that UN provided courses, such as the Senior Mission Leader Course, are coordinated with AU requirements. It is equally envisaged that the UN will continue to provide support in other areas of ASF training initiatives. In this, the PSOD will be more active in setting curricula. Furthermore records will be kept of individuals who have benefited from this training.

   b. **Mission Support.** Coordination of Mission support requirements with the UN is important because the deployment of the ASF is predicated on handing over to the UN. Logistic support in conjunction with the UN is a key area to be developed under the Roadmap.

European Union (EU)

27. At the core of the AU-EU partnership is the need for a strengthened dialogue and institutional cooperation to address issues of peace and stability in Africa, with a view to enhancing the ability of the continent to respond timely and appropriately to peace and security threats. The EU Support continues to be required for capacity building and for training both within the overall ASF but most particularly within the AUC.

**PLAN OF ACTION**

28. A proposed Plan of Action to implement the proposals contained in this Roadmap is attached at Annex A.